Civil Aviation
Boeing 737 MAX: Report accuses Boeing like the FAA
Boeing 737 MAX: Report accuses Boeing like the FAA
© Boeing

| Antony Angrand

Boeing 737 MAX: Report accuses Boeing like the FAA

The congress committee on transport and infrastructure delivered its report "Design, development and certification of the Boeing 737MAX" on September 16, 2020. It clearly mentions that Boeing and the FAA share the responsibility for the development and final certification of a dangerous aircraft.

"A dangerous aircraft"

The 245-page report published on September 16, 2020 on the investigation by the US Congressional Committee on the design, development and certification of the Boeing 737 Max does not go hand in hand with the Seattle aircraft manufacturer as well. than the FAA. He spelled out that "Boeing and the FAA share responsibility for the development and final certification of a dangerous aircraft. Both must learn critical lessons from these tragic accidents to improve the certification process and the FAA must improve significantly. his oversight of Boeing ". This report cites a series of engineering failures, mismanagement and oversight issues leading to the two crashes that killed 346 people.

Insufficient FAA oversight

"A manufacturer that was once great" This is what can be read in the conclusions, which stress the need to restore Seattle to a culture of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer is currently striving to achieve. like restoring a tarnished image. The findings state that the accidents, the first involving a Lion Air 737 MAX8, on October 29, 2018 and the second Ethiopian Airlines also involving a 737 MAX8, which occurred on March 10, 2019, were not the result of a failure. or a technical error, but a series of incorrect technical assumptions on the part of Boeing engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing management and insufficient monitoring on the part of the FAA.

Missed opportunities

The report also emphasizes the multiple missed opportunities that could have transformed the design and development of the 737 MAX, missed opportunities in particular due to production pressures. Unsurprisingly, the report also notes flawed design assumptions on Boeing’s part centered around the aircraft’s MCAS and its operation linked to a single AOA sensor. As we previously mentioned in one of our print editions, the report states that Boeing incorrectly assumed that pilots, most of whom had no knowledge of the system, would be able to overcome any malfunction. Boeing also failed to classify MCAS as a safety critical system, which would have triggered further scrutiny by the FAA during the certification process ... and possibly saved lives. A report that we will talk about shortly.


Answer to () :

Frank Sterle Jr. | 19/09/2020 21:20

A common refrain especially prevails amongst Western capitalist nation governments and big business circles: best business practices are best decided by business decision-makers. Yet this was proven false by, as a most consequential example, Boeing’s decision to delay the grounding of its ill-fated 737 Max planes, regardless of indicators, including employee warnings, they should be grounded and serious software glitches corrected. While an ousted CEO received more than $62 million to leave Boeing—perhaps from what’s now described as a ‘culture of concealment’—346 ticket-buyers received a most horrific death. Also, when the COVID-19 crisis began, the most influential, and maybe even the first, voices to have the ear of governments likely were the largest corporations, particularly the airlines. The result was resistance against an immediate halt in international commerce, including overseas flights, weeks of delay that may have translated into many COVID-19 deaths.